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The term “mercenary” evokes a virulent impression. With today’s pri-
vate military contractors (PMCs) undertaking operations akin to those that 
led states to condemn the use of mercenaries over a century ago (and then 
again four decades ago),1 it seems sensible to hold a jaundiced conception 
when no international laws decidedly apply and national laws may not be 
effective in regulating PMC undertakings.2 
 
* M.A. Political Science (University of Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Universi-
ty of Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown University). The author has taught 
international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at 
the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma 
College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Mi-
ami. 
 1. Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputa-
tion, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 853, 874 (2008) (noting that “the term ‘mercenary’ carries 
an unflattering connotation that the private military industry has been keen to avoid—and 
with good reason: Closer examination reveals that the concerns with private contractors . . . 
closely resemble the concerns that led to the development of international law on mercenar-
ies.”). 
 2. Kathrin Herbst, Private Security Companies and Civil-Military Cooperation, in 
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES: CHANCES, PROBLEMS, PITFALLS AND 
46 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
With significant attention fixed on the Bush Administration’s unprece-
dented reliance on PMCs during the Iraq War and occupation, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur initiated an investigation and produced a report 
that proposed regulating the private security firm market and distinguishing 
PMCs from mercenary forces, but did not recommend banning PMCs.3 In 
November 2013, the U.N. Working Group on the use of mercenaries af-
firmed that “[p]roviding security is a fundamental human right and funda-
mental responsibility of the State” and emphasized that governments 
worldwide must participate in “robust international regulation of private 
military and security companies.”4 Those concerns were voiced shortly after 
new criminal charges were brought in United States District Court in Octo-
ber 2013 against Blackwater personnel for their reported involvement in the 
Nisour Square massacre that killed 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007.5 The United 
States Department of Justice has much discretion in deciding whether to 
prosecute, but there were very few prosecutions of contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.6 
 
PROSPECTS 273, 284–85 (Thomas Jäger & Gerhard Kümmel eds., 2007). The lack of regula-
tion over PMCs was recognized by the British government even before the Iraq War. 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, REPORT, 2001-02, H.C. 922 at 
12–22, 29–40 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/
cmselect/cmfaff/922/922.pdf. 
 3. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Spec. Rappor-
teur, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and Its Application to Peoples Under Colo-
nial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation: Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violat-
ing Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, 
¶¶ 60, 66, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/14 (Dec. 8, 2004). 
 4. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, UN Expert Group Calls for Robust 
International Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies, U.N. HUM. RIGHTS 
(Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
13940&LangID=E. 
 5. Frederic J. Frommer & Eric Tucker, Ex-Blackwater Contractors Face Fresh Charg-
es in Iraq, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/10/17/blackwater/3004319/. U.S. prosecutors did eventually indict 
five Blackwater guards on involuntary manslaughter charges in the D.C. District Court in 
January 2009. Indictment, United States v. Slough, No. CR-08-360 (filed D.D.C. Dec. 4, 
2008), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq/blackwater-indictment1208ind.
html; see also John R. Crook, ed., U.S. Congress and Administration Consider Responses to 
Excessive Uses of Force by U.S. Security Firms, 102 AM. J. INT’L .L. 161, 162 (2008); James 
Risen, Guards Plead Not Guilty in ‘07 Killings in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/middleeast/07blackwater.html?_r=0. 
That case was dismissed. Frommer & Tucker, supra. Four guards were recently convicted. 
Matt Apuzzo, Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html?_r=0. 
 6. Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns: An Analysis of Two Federal Defenses to 
Tort Lawsuits Against Military Contractors, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 395, 433 (2009). 
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Mercenaries are the forerunners of today’s private military contractors7 
and the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s recommendation to differentiate PMCs 
from mercenaries is accordant with the controversy that flourished over 
whether U.S. security firms and PMCs might be defined as mercenaries.8 
Former Assistant Secretary of State William Schaufele interpreted the prob-
lem by explaining that “[a] legally accepted definition of what constitutes a 
mercenary does not exist in international law.”9 Clear-cut cases of mercenar-
ism can be readily identified, but there are challenges to determining when 
private contractors should be considered mercenaries because PMC activi-
ties may circumvent narrow interpretations of mercenarism and elude calcu-
lated policies of impeding certain uses of force under international law.10 
Simply stating that certain PMC operations do not meet the elements of 
mercenarism does not mean that PMC operations are necessarily licit. 
To commence with the analysis of core elements that might be consid-
ered for a statutory framework or international convention governing the use 
of PMCs, Part II provides a brief chronology of the emergence of the sover-
eign system in relation to the preexisting use of mercenaries to emphasize 
 
 7. John S. Kemp, Note, Private Military Firms and Responses to Their Accountability 
Gap, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 489, 493 (2010). 
 8. See United Nations, Press Release, Private Security Companies Engaging in New 
Forms of Mercenary Activity, Says UN Working Group, (Nov. 6, 2007), http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=5698&LangID=E; 
Jonathan Finer, Holstering the Hiring Guns: New Accountability Measures for Private Secu-
rity Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259, 259 (2008); Kristen McCallion, War for Sale! 
Battlefield Contractors in Latin America & the ‘Corporatization’ of America’s War on 
Drugs, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 317, 319 (2005); Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle 
With Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
1, 2 (1999); Leslie Wayne, America’s For-Profit Secret Army, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/business/america-s-for-profit-secret-army.html. 
 9. Melysa H. Sperber, Note, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the 
Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for American Nationals Captured Abroad 
While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 194 (2003); See also Molly 
Dunigan, A Lesson From Iraq War: How to Outsource War to Private Contractors, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/
Opinion/2013/0319/A-lesson-from-Iraq-war-How-to-outsource-war-to-private-contractors 
(stating that “[t]here are no clear-cut guidelines for [PMC] status under international law”). 
 10. For example, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions defines a merce-
nary as an individual who is recruited to fight in armed conflict, takes direct part in hostilities 
with the motivation for private gain, and is not a national of or sent by a party to the conflict 
or a member of a party’s armed forces. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) (1977), art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol Additional]. The motiva-
tion element is generally evident with PMCs, but the contractor’s nexus to the sovereign state 
and its activities are critical because general international law principles require states to 
assume responsibility when they actuate combat operations, whereas individuals or groups 
that engage in international hostilities outside of sovereign rules can be viewed as illegal 
under either international law or domestic law, or both. 
48 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
why premises underlying the sovereign system should prevail over efforts to 
inject technicalities into governing definitions of a mercenary. Part III em-
ploys a sliding scale of PMC operations and affixes offensive combat opera-
tions and unreasonable defensive combat operations as most suspect and 
tantamount to mercenarism. The analysis proposes that states produce a con-
sensus on sanctioned PMC activities and recommends that the burden be 
placed on the state that hires PMCs to perform contestable operations; ac-
cordingly, should a PMC reasonably be deemed a mercenary, the hiring 
state would be responsible for the PMC’s activities under international law 
and the PMC would be punished in a manner equivalent to that state’s offi-
cial armed forces. 
II. HISTORICAL USE OF PRIVATEERING AND THE ABOLITION OF 
MERCENARIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Mercenarism: The Historical Norm 
Across the world and throughout recorded history, humans have fought 
for money, political causes, rulers, wealth, employers,11 regional allegiances, 
family, honor,12 and survival. Multiple reasons generated varying degrees of 
intensity for individuals to be willing to sell security services to another and 
to participate in offensive operations or conquest. For example, in 331 B.C., 
Alexander the Great hired tens of thousands of mercenaries to attack Per-
sia.13 Professionally raised knights in England defended aristocrats and feu-
dal landowners,14 samurai in Japan fought for honor and originated as a pro-
tector of wealthy landowners,15 and the Kshatriya in India served as the war-
rior and governance caste that enforced societal hierarchy and protected the 
landed elite.16 Feudalism was an intensely strong form of privatization17 and 
 
 11. Ellen L. Frye, Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining 
“Mercenary” Can Tame the “Dogs of War,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607, 2612 (2005). 
 12. Kevin H. Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at Private Military Firms: Interna-
tional Law Misses its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 55, 58–63 (2008). 
 13. C.W.C. OMAN, AN ELEMENTARY HISTORY OF GREECE: FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 
THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT 224 (1899); Heather Carney, Note, Prosecuting the 
Lawless: Human Rights Abuses and Private Military Firms, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 321 
(2006). 
 14. Edmund King, Large and Small Landlords in Thirteenth-Century England: The 
Case of Peterborough Abbey, in LANDLORDS, PEASANTS AND POLITICS IN MEDIEVAL 
ENGLAND 141, 143–44 (T.H. Aston ed., 2006). 
 15. STEPHEN TURNBULL, THE SAMURAI: A MILITARY HISTORY 18 (1977). 
 16. CRAIG A. LOCKARD, SOCIETIES, NETWORKS, AND TRANSITIONS: A GLOBAL HISTORY 
46 (2nd ed. 2010); ASHWANI KUMAR, COMMUNITY WARRIORS: STATE, PEASANTS AND CASTE 
ARMIES IN BIHAR 10–12 (2008). 
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norms were upheld by collective violence, without which, feudal rule as a 
form of societal governance might have lost resilience.18 Centuries ago, it 
was the rule rather than the exception that local inhabitants, landowners, 
clans, and rulers, established communal and city arrangements to protect the 
status quo with hired force to defend against militants and rivals willing to 
raid or overturn existing conditions.19 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a lucrative private mili-
tary market developed in Europe as mercenaries began fighting for employ-
ers who were willing to provide the most compensation.20 Combatants plun-
dered in offensive operations and victors appropriated spoils of war.21 Even 
the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) was fought predominantly with merce-
naries.22 By 1782, the British East Asian mercenary force employed over 
100,000 soldiers from assorted countries to fight in colonial conquests.23 
Britain merged private military company operations with mercantilism when 
it constituted the English East India Company in India24 and by establishing 
the Hudson Bay Company, which engaged in commercial transactions and 
fought rivals in Eastern Canada.25 In South Africa, the British South Africa 
Company and the British South Africa Police also hired company soldiers to 
enforce colonialism.26 
 
 17. Edward Rubin, Book Review, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization: 
Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 
894 (2010). 
 18. MARK IRVING LICHBACH, THE REBEL’S DILEMMA 130 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1995) 
(noting how peasants in France during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries assembled for 
secret meetings to vote and decide whether to rebel with arms). 
 19. Avner Greif, Self-Enforcing Political Systems and Economic Growth: Late Medieval 
Genoa, in ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 23, 26–28, 53, 56, 59 (1998). 
 20. Sarah Percy, Morality and Regulation, in FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE 
AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 11, 11–12 (Simon Chesterman & Chia 
Lehnardt eds., 2007). 
 21. P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 29 (2003); Mary H. Cooper, Private Affair: New Reliance on America’s Other 
Army, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2186, 2196 (2004). 
 22. RICHARD BONNEY, ESSENTIAL HISTORIES: THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 1618–1648 68 
(2002). 
 23. Frye, supra note 11, at 2618. 
 24. MICHAEL LEE LANNING, MERCENARIES: SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE, FROM ANCIENT 
GREECE TO TODAY’S PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 36–37 (2005); SINGER, supra note 21, at 
37. See generally PHILIP LAWSON, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: A HISTORY (1993); K. N. 
CHAUDHURI, THE TRADING WORLD OF ASIA AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1160–
1760 (1978). 
 25. JIM NOLES, A POCKETFUL OF HISTORY: FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICA—ONE 
STATE QUARTER AT A TIME 190–91 (2008). 
 26. JOHN S. GALBRAITH, CROWN AND CHARTER: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE BRITISH 
SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY 121–22, 310–20 (1974). 
50 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
Fighters from these early historical eras sometimes pledged an oath of 
allegiance to a political power,27 but citizenship and sovereign-societal rela-
tions were relative concepts because the system for organizing soldiers was 
not fully established28 and there was no large-scale legitimate consent from 
citizens based on national devotion.29 For example, the American Revolu-
tion displays a transition from informal and ad hoc fighters to a system of 
self-determined governance. Settlers, many of whom were farmers rather 
than professional soldiers, took up arms as members of the Continental Ar-
my on their home soil in a war of liberation against England,30 but the new 
nation provided for a congressionally-authorized national military, state 
militias, and informal privateers.31 The abolition of the latter became a uni-
versal norm under international law while the former two remained, subject 
to sovereign control. 
Exchanging security and military services for financial compensation 
has a long history. Over the last 150 years, however, mercenarism has been 
challenged in three successive stages—with the growing hostility toward 
privateering and piracy, with the rise of state sovereignty and the concomi-
tant understanding that governments raise military forces and have responsi-
bility over the use of force, and with the opposition to attempts by colonial 
powers to retain influence in former colonies. 
B. Illegal Private Forces Under International Law 
1. Stage I: Eliminating Privateering and Piracy 
Under the United States Constitution and as a means of self-defense, 
Congress issued Letters of Marque to authorize private citizens to use lethal 
 
 27. Won Kidane, The Status of Private Military Contractors Under International Hu-
manitarian Law, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 361, 373 (2010). 
 28. SINGER, supra note 21, at 19–20. 
 29. C. E. MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE ROUSSEAU 475 
(Columbia Univ. Press 1900) (mentioning that some rights deriving from sovereignty include 
making “legislation, supreme jurisdiction, police power, conscription, and the taxing pow-
er”). The legitimacy of rights and obligations of citizens and the government would ostensi-
bly be more justified and standardized after citizenship is granted and often enfranchisement. 
 30. ANDREW K. FRANK, PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY: AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: PEOPLE AND PERSPECTIVES 1 (2008) (“The American Revolution would not 
have happened without ordinary farmers. . . . [T]hey did the bulk of the fighting”); Stephen 
M. Blizzard & Marsha Kwolek, Increasing Reliance of Contractors on the Battlefield: How 
Do We Keep From Crossing the Line?, A.F. J. LOGISTICS 142, 144–145 (2004) (stating that 
even George Washington reportedly used contractors for providing carpentry, transportation, 
medical services, and food for the continental army). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 11, 14, 16; STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 23 
(1982). 
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force against foreign people.32 Letters of Marque differed from operations 
involving non-state actors, such as mercenaries, who are generally not au-
thorized by the state and do not share bounties with the United States.33 The 
evils of privateering were recognized early in American history, and particu-
larly after the Civil War;34 the Lieber Code defined organized bands of bel-
ligerents who engaged in hostilities without state authorization as combat-
ants who were not entitled to a privileged prisoner of war status.35 More 
generally, during the nineteenth century private and state-sponsored com-
merce raiders posed a threat to all trading states because they attacked oce-
anic trade routes and plundered merchant vessels as prizes, but this practice 
was eventually condemned36 as a form of piracy37 subject to universal crimi-
nal jurisdiction under international law. 38  European countries renounced 
 
 32. THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 
(5th ed. 1878). 
 33. See Matthew J. Gaul, Note & Comment, Regulating the New Privateers: Private 
Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque and Reprisal Clause, 31 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1489, 1510–12 (1998) (comparing the private contractor system to the marque and 
reprisal system and explaining that it should be Congress that has the ultimate authority over 
hiring contractors). 
 34. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24 n.43 (1957) (noting that George Washington 
warned “Mercenary Armies . . . have at one time or another subverted the liberties of almost 
all the Countries they have been raised to defend”) (quoting 26 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, at 388 (John C. Fitz-
patrick ed., 1944)). 
 35. A Prisoner of War status is granted to captured combatants who are (1) commanded 
by leaders, (2) wear recognizable combat insignia, (3) openly carry arms, and (4) obey laws 
of war. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 4, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; FRANCIS LIEBER, GEN. ORDER NO. 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, art. 82 (1863) (“Men, or 
squads of men, who commit hostilities . . . without commission, without being part and por-
tion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do 
so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption 
of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of 
soldiers—such men . . . are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be 
treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.”). 
 36. Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Gov-
ernment Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 
19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8–9, 16–19, 29 (2007); 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 92 (1826) (James Kent explained on the floor of Congress that “privateering, 
under all the restrictions which have been adopted, is very liable to abuse.”), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/jk/jk_000.htm. 
 37. Pirates raided on behalf of states. Parrillo, supra note 36, at 54–55; see also David 
Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 957, 972–74 (2009) (emphasizing that nations granted legitimacy to their own sea 
warriors but deemed adversary-pirates subject to universal jurisdiction criminal offenses); 
H.W. Malkin, The Inner History of the Declaration of Paris, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 30 
(1927) (Queen Victoria remarking that “[p]rivateering is a kind of Piracy”). 
 38. Parrillo, supra note 36, at 31–32. 
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privateering, making it illegal pursuant to the Declaration of Paris in 1856,39 
but the U.S. Congress did not officially abolish naval prize money until the 
1890s.40 
Private mercenary forces were common centuries ago41 and wars were 
not fought solely by sovereign states and their official standing armies.42 In 
fact, almost every U.S. military operation in history has involved some civil-
ian assistance to the military,43 but civilians who did accompany the military 
were subject to military jurisdiction for their actions.44 It is also anachronis-
tic to compare the provision of minor contract services during early periods, 
such as during the Civil War, with the most recent U.S. wars in which PMCs 
functioned more like military troops.45 The menace of sanctioning PMCs to 
function like troops is coherent from the progression that made non-state 
combatants incompatible with the emergence of sovereignty. 
 
 39. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, art. 1, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 2; 
Parrillo, supra note 36, at 50–52; WOOLSEY, supra note 32, at 212–13. 
 40. See Franklin Pierce, Second Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 4, 1854), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29495 (noting the United States’ isolationist 
position with other countries and the danger of agreeing to principles that other countries 
could breach and disadvantage the United States, emphasizing that the “bare statement of the 
condition in which the United States would be placed, after having surrendered the right to 
resort to privateers, in the event of war with a belligerent of naval supremacy will show that 
this Government could never listen to such a proposition”); see also Parrillo, supra note 36, 
at 11, 32, 50–51, 63–64, 69–76. Oddly enough, Congress introduced the Marque and Reprisal 
Act in 2001 that failed, but would have permitted issuing letters of marque and reprisal to 
permit private profiteering in mercenary actions. H.R. 3074, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 41. See LEONARD GAULTIER ET AL., THE MERCENARY ISSUE AT THE UN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH 16 (2001) (contending general international 
acceptance of mercenary forces until relatively recently); Percy, supra note 20, at 12; SINGER, 
supra note 21, at 20; Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs 
and the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 
148 (2005); J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—And Their Relevance to Whether “Let-
ters of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 465, 472 (2005). 
 42. Govern & Bales, supra note 12, at 58; Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial 
Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2003) (writing that “[t]he sovereign’s resort to mercenaries is as old as history itself”). 
 43. Wm. C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Ju-
risdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367, 377–80 
(2006); Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Drowning in Blackwater: How Weak Accountability Over Pri-
vate Security Contractors Significantly Undermines Counterinsurgency Efforts, ARMY LAW. 
July 2008, at 67 (stating that U.S. military history has a “rich tradition of using contractors on 
the battlefield”). 
 44. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battlefield: A 
Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal Jurisdiction 
Over Civilian Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491, 495 (2008). 
 45. Katherine Jackson, Not Quite A Civilian, Not Quite A Soldier: How Five Words 
Could Subject Civilian Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to Military Jurisdiction, 27 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 255, 283 (2007). 
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2. Stage II: Establishing Sovereignty: Wars are Between States 
Technological development, the emergence of state sovereignty, na-
tionalism, and social changes led to a system in which sovereign prerogative 
and respect governed international affairs.46 Reciprocal state-citizen obliga-
tions and responsibilities induced a nation’s citizens to voluntarily and in-
voluntarily serve the state military, based on government decisions to as-
semble and use military force.47 States began to formally and regularly raise 
organized militaries with citizens by the end of the eighteenth century.48 As 
sovereignty and internal state administration became more solidified, private 
military forces diminished in use, which is a natural progression because 
only sovereign governments have a legal right to impose internal coercive 
rule49—unauthorized attacks against others may be crimes, depending on 
how the law is defined and enforced, and militant organizations that collec-
tivize and perpetrate aggressions against the government in power may be 
engaging in a form of terrorism.50 Similarly, if a sovereign employs private 
combatants for operations in a foreign territory, this violates the sovereign 
rights of the target country.51 
With the rise of official sovereignty, social contract theories ascribed 
the right to engage in warfare to the state, with citizens being parcel to that 
 
 46. Terence Turner, Class Projects, Social Consciousness, and the Contradictions of 
“Globalization,” in GLOBALIZATION, THE STATE, AND VIOLENCE 35, 41–42 (Jonathan Fried-
man ed., 2003). 
 47. SINGER, supra note 21, at 29–32. 
 48. Id. at 29–30. 
 49. Michael H. Hoffman, Terrorists Are Unlawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combat-
ants: A Distinction with Implications for the Future of International Humanitarian Law, 34 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 227, 227 (2002); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of 
Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004). 
 50. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2004) (terrorism is “the unlawful use of force and violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”). 
 51. States cannot direct mercenary groups to carry out aggressions in another sovereign 
territory. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27, 1986) (discussing illegal aggression, which 
is the “sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to acts 
of aggression”). China even proposed this restriction as an explanation of a state’s obligation 
to restrict aggression: “Provision of support to armed groups, formed within [a member 
state’s] territory, which have invaded the territory of another state; or refusal, notwithstanding 
the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory all the measures in its power to 
deprive such groups of all assistance or protection.” Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the 
Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 841 (2001) (quoting Tentative Chinese Pro-
posals for a General International Organization (Aug. 23, 1944), 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 718, 725). 
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action.52 Consequently, privatized military forces were perceived as immoral 
in light of social contract theories of citizen-government relations, particu-
larly in the case of democratic governance because of the assumption that 
the populace indirectly sanctioned military operations.53 Likewise, a fore-
most attribute of the deliberative element of state sovereignty is the authori-
ty to choose peaceful or non-peaceful relations with other sovereigns, 54 
which has a cardinal constituent of rights and restrictions formed on public 
sovereign authority. This became thoroughly explicit after the United Na-
tions Charter was adopted; there was no more decisive responsibility and 
obligation for states than to abide by the system of the use of force under 
international law, whereas the use of PMCs can weaken “states’ collective 
ability to monopolize violence in the international system.”55 
3. Stage III: Targeting and Abolishing Mercenaries 
The third notable crackdown on the use of private military force un-
folded with former colonies struggling to attain independence from colonial 
powers that employed state-sponsored terrorism to perpetuate influence over 
 
 52. ANDREW G. FIALA, THE JUST WAR MYTH: THE MORAL ILLUSIONS OF WAR 48 (2008) 
(“for modern liberals, war is best understood as an act of the general will authorized by the 
social contract”). Combatants are agents of the state, but those agents must also observe 
humanitarian protections. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF 
WAR 27 (3rd ed. 2004) (noting that “armed hostilities should as far as possible be between 
organized armed forces, not entire societies: hence the efforts to maintain a ‘firebreak’ distin-
guishing legitimate military targets from civilian objections and people not involved in armed 
hostilities.”); BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 287–88 (2nd ed. 2013) (stating that 
combatants on one side become aggressors to the other side, which makes the aggressors 
subject to lethal retaliation under collective self-defense because of the status of affiliated 
combatants). 
 53. Simon Chesterman, Leashing the Dogs of War: The Rise of Private Military and 
Security Companies, 5 CARNEGIE REP. 37, 38 (2008). Consequently, individuals or groups 
wielding force without the authority of the state had no legitimacy at the domestic or interna-
tional levels. The use of violence outside of state authorization is illegal because states should 
be held responsible for wrongs. Fighting for profit is not a valid justification. The concept of 
privatized military forces for war-making outside of state military responsibility has been 
eliminated from every angle because of its repulsiveness, but this does not mean that a minor 
use of private contractors for certain functions as an adjunct to the official military would be 
prohibited. 
 54. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. VI, at 69 (B. Jowett, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1885); 
Hoffman, supra note 49, at 227 (stating that “non-state combatants . . . have almost no place 
legally in the structure of interstate conflict”). This interaction can further be theorized as 
two-level interactions between citizens and government at the domestic level and sovereign at 
the international level. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 460 (1988). 
 55. DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET OF FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING 
SECURITY 264 (2005). 
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former colonies. 56  At a time when decolonization was the international 
norm, former colonial powers engaged in the unofficial use of force with 
mercenaries, and these transgressions hindered self-determination,57 propped 
up amiable regimes to the highest bidder,58 undermined humanitarian treat-
ment for locals, and fostered covert means of control.59 Elites and firms 
hired mercenaries to guard diamond mines and oil facilities60 and hired pri-
vatized military forces to battle over control of natural resources.61 Corpo-
rate firms even funded mercenary employees by allocating payment for ser-
vices from mining and oil concessions.62 Consequently, target countries and 
the international community revolted against the private military system63 
and sought to ban mercenaries during the 1960s.64 At the same time, howev-
 
 56. FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 275–77 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 2012). 
 57. SINGER, supra note 21, at 37; see LANNING, supra note 24, at 153–67. 
 58. SINGER, supra note 21, at 102–04; Sapone, supra note 8, at 2–3; Kevin Whitelaw, 
Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 1997, at 46–47. 
 59. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 114 (2nd ed. 2000) 
(explaining that due to the “number of mercenaries who enrolled in colonial armies or were 
prepared to serve for pay in campaigns directed against national liberation groups, wide-
spread agitation among third world states resulted in the condemnation” of mercenaries); 
SINGER, supra note 21, at 37 (emphasizing that mercenaries were working in weak states and 
for corporations, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s); Govern & Bales, supra note 12, at 
62–63 (noting that the use of PMCs promoted Apartheid); Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Account-
ability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1119 (2004) (stating that private contractors may “help prop up rogue 
regimes, resist struggles for self-determination, and contribute to the proliferation and diffu-
sion of weaponry and soldiers around the world—axiomatically a destabilizing and thus 
undesirable phenomenon.”). 
 60. SINGER, supra note 21, at 158; Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of 
War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Dis-
order, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 100 (1998); Frye, supra note 11, at 2620. 
 61. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, The Right of Peoples to 
Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or 
Foreign Occupation, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/20 (Jan. 10, 2002) (stating that there are 
still “grave crises threatening government stability and dogged struggles for the control of 
rich natural resources, including petroleum and mineral deposits” in Africa). 
 62. SINGER, supra note 21, at 109. The use of private contractors became highly criti-
cized again in Sierra Leone in 1995 when Anthony Buckingham hired private military forces 
to protect diamond mine concessions that he was given by the government. Id. at 4, 112–13. 
 63. Adam Ebrahim, Note, Going to War with the Army You can Afford: The United 
States, International Law, and the Private Military Industry, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 181, 203 
(2010). 
 64. Govern & Bales, supra note 12, at 63; Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Compa-
nies, Their Status Under International Humanitarian Law, and Its Impact on Their Regula-
tion, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 573, 580 (2006) (expressing that “the shameful character of 
mercenary activity” is the reason for condemning their use); Frye, supra note 11, at 2612 
(“Mercenary activity is unsettling to a world organized by nation-states, as the image of a 
soldier of fortune loyal to no state disrupts the current state-oriented hegemony.”). 
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er, there was a subdued emergence of PMCs being employed to provide 
logistics services and covert and combat assistance to official state-
sanctioned military operations.65 
A series of United Nations General Assembly resolutions further af-
firmed principles of sovereignty, as codified in the U.N. Charter. By a vote 
of 109 in favor and 0 in opposition, the United Nations General Assembly 
passed Resolution 2131 (1965), which states that “no State has the right to 
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State.”66 In 1970, General Assembly Resolution 
2625 pronounced that states have a “duty to refrain from organizing or en-
couraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including 
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.”67 In 1973, and 
with 83 votes in favor and 13 votes against, the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 3103, which affirmed that “[t]he use of mercenaries by colonial 
and racist regimes against national liberation movements struggling for their 
freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domina-
tion is considered to be a criminal act and the mercenaries should according-
ly be punished as criminals.”68 In 1974, General Assembly Resolution 3314 
was adopted with overwhelming assent and stated that U.N. Charter Article 
2(4) should be read to consider “the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” an illegal use of force 
“against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State.”69 
In 1993, the General Assembly again called the use of mercenaries a threat 
to the peace under the U.N. Charter.70 Resolution 3314 expressly sought to 
 
 65. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, Private Military Companies & 
International Law: Building New Ladders of Legal Accountability & Responsibility, 11 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 99, 104 (2009). At the same time this strong backlash began, 
the Pentagon employed tens of thousands of South Korean, Thai and Filipino soldiers to fight 
in the Vietnam War. Frye, supra note 11, at 2615 n.76. These were poor countries at the time, 
which may mean that the Pentagon could pay less and reduce negative fallout for increased 
U.S. death tolls. 
 66. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States 
and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), ¶1, U.N. 
GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965); Edward McWhin-
ney, Q.C., General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965 Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty 1 (2010), available at http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_2131-
xx/ga_2131-xx_e.pdf. 
 67. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. 
A/8/82 (1970). 
 68. Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial 
and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103 (XXVIII), art. 5, U.N. GAOR, 
28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 12, 1973). 
 69. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 
Supp. No. 31, (U.N. Doc. A/9631), at 143, (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 70. G.A. Res. 48/92, pmbl. (Dec. 20, 1993). 
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define the term “aggression,” which is something that the Security Council 
has not done.71 This absence may not be surprising given the Cold War in-
terventions by major powers during the era of decolonization72 and the pri-
vatization of the military services of the dominant powers after the Cold 
War ended.73 
4. Stage IV: International Conventions 
International conventions also affirm that mercenaries have no place in 
modern armed conflict because states are required to assume responsibility 
for wrongs during combat and for war crimes, and official military troops 
are agents of the state and act in accordance with sovereign decisions. Pur-
suant to this relationship, which frames state militaries as principals and 
troops as their agents, only states can legally constitute military forces.74 A 
state’s belligerents can kill or wound enemy forces in lawful combat or be 
killed or wounded in combat, and these acts in battle are not individual 
criminal offenses.75 Apprehended combatants can be detained for the dura-
tion of hostilities, but several categories of Prisoners of War (POWs)76 have 
privileges that prevent them from being prosecuted and punished for execut-
 
 71. Anna Spain, The U.N. Security Council’s Duty to Decide, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 
320, 340 (2013). 
 72. Lawrence D. Freedman, Book Review, The Global Cold War: Third World Interven-
tions and the Making of Our Times, 85 FOREIGN AFFS. 157, 457 (2006) (stating that the United 
States and Soviet Union “could claim impressive anticolonial credentials,” but “upheavals set 
in motion by decolonization [can be viewed] as an extension of their confrontation.”). 
 73. See infra Part III.A. 
 74. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of War, NAT’L INTEREST, 
Fall 2003, at 57, 61; See Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and 
States: Actors, Interactions, and Reactions, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 67, 70 (2006) (stating that 
there “is the belief that the state should have a monopoly over the use of violence”). 
 75. See LIEBER, supra note 35, at art. 57; JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAW 319 (1st ed. 1990); Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary 
Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 9–10 (2004) 
(noting that as long as POWs have not engaged in conduct that is a war crime, detention is 
based on the duration of combat and not on individual criminal acts). 
 76. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva POW] (granting protected POW 
status if they have “fallen into the power of the enemy,” which include: (1) members of an 
armed force; (2) militia members who wear an emblem and follow orders from a military 
leader; (3) armed force members who are not a member of a state to the conflict; (4) civilians 
providing services to the military; (5) civil air members of a party to the conflict; and (6) 
civilians who rise up to defend against an invading military force). 
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ing a state’s orders to engage in combat because wars are conflicts among 
sovereign entities and not individuals.77 
Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions in 
1977 expressly denies POW status to mercenaries.78 The Protocol Additional 
defines mercenaries as anyone who is recruited to fight in armed conflict, 
takes direct part in hostilities with the motivation for private gain, is not a 
national of a party to the conflict or a member of a party’s armed force, and 
has not been deployed by a state that is not a party to the conflict.79 The Pro-
tocol Additional does not by its terms treat PMCs as mercenaries, 80  but 
PMCs may have characteristics similar to mercenaries if there is a lack of 
state accountability. 
Protocol I criminalizes the acts of “mercenaries . . . who participate di-
rectly in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence” and the actions of the 
person who “recruits, uses, finances, or trains mercenaries.”81 To be consid-
ered a mercenary under Article 47, the individual in question must engage in 
combat82 that is either offensive or defensive in nature.83 However, the need 
 
 77. KARMA NABULSI, TRADITIONS OF WAR: OCCUPATION, RESISTANCE, AND THE LAW 66 
(1999) (Jean-Jacques Rousseau noting that “war is between nations,” not between private 
individuals); Berman, supra note 75, at 9. 
 78. Protocol Additional, supra note 10, art. 47 (“A mercenary shall not have the right to 
be a combatant or a prisoner of war”). This is also logical because the use of mercenaries is 
illegal through conventions and General Assembly resolutions. 
 79. Id. art 47; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 
1977, Commentary—Mercenaries, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/ffc84b7639b26f93c12563cd00
434156? (“[O]nly a combatant, and a combatant taking a direct part in hostilities, can be 
considered as a mercenary in the sense of Article 47.”). 
 80. Michael Scheimer, Comment, Separating Private Military Companies From Illegal 
Mercenaries in International Law: Proposing an International Convention for Legitimate 
Military and Security Support That Reflects Customary International Law, 24 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 609, 613 (2009). To automatically regard PMCs as mercenaries would seem to be 
inconsistent with classification in the 1949 Geneva Convention. Geneva POW, supra note 76, 
art. 4. 
 81. Ryan M. Scoville, Toward an Accountability-Based Definition of “Mercenary,” 37 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 541, 550 (2006). 
 82. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 
575 n.18 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf. 
 83. Marina Mancini, Private Military and Security Company Employees: Are They the 
Mercenaries of the Twenty-First Century?, at 10 (Acad. of Eur. L., EUI Working Paper No. 
AEL 2010/5, 2010), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14745/AEL_2010_05.pdf?
sequence=4 (noting that “taking part in offensive combat operations qualified as direct partic-
ipation in hostilities,” that “[e]ngaging in defensive combat also constitutes direct participa-
tion in hostilities,” and that “international humanitarian law does not draw a distinction be-
tween offensive and defensive operations”). 
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to end colonialism was so imperative that Article 1 of Geneva Protocol I 
granted protections to nonstate belligerents when the justification is for 
“fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.”84 This meant 
that state-sponsored private contractor activities might still receive a lawful 
combatant status predominantly due to an agency relationship between the 
state and the private contractor for specific functions.85 
To address regional concerns, in 1977 the Organization for African 
Unity adopted a Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, 
which defines mercenaries and bans them when employed to thwart “a pro-
cess of self-determination, stability, or the territorial integrity of another 
State.”86 In 1989, the General Assembly adopted the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Re-
cruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries87 and the 1989 U.N. 
Convention on Mercenaries,88 which per se ban the use of mercenaries. The 
U.N. Convention defines four mercenary activities that constitute a criminal 
offense; perpetrating mercenary activities, recruiting and training mercenar-
ies, attempting to use mercenaries, and acting as an accomplice to mercenar-
ies.89 This Convention makes it a crime to engage in any mercenary activity, 
and requires member states to implement and enforce legislation that is con-
sistent with those restrictions.90 It became effective as a treaty in 2001,91 but 
only 33 countries are members and 17 states have signed; notably, no Euro-
pean Union or G8 members have signed.92 
 
 84. Protocol Additional, supra note 10, art. 1(4). 
 85. Scoville, supra note 81, at 550. 
 86. Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in 
Africa, opened for signature on July 3, 1977, art. 1, 1490 U.N.T.S. 96, 97. The other telling 
factor is that the conventions were directed at violations of international law in the form of 
international conflicts. See also SINGER, supra note 21, at 41. 
 87. Rep., Ad Hoc Comm. on the Drafting of an Int’l Convention Against the Recruit-
ment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, GAOR, Sixth Comm., U.N. Doc. 
A/44/766, (Nov. 22, 1989). 
 88. G.A. Resolution 44/34, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) [hereinafter U.N. 
Mercenary Convention]; LINDSEY CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL, PRIVATIZING WAR: 
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (2013) 
(emphasizing that “recent General Assembly resolutions relating to the suppression of mer-
cenary activity do not draw a bright line between private military and security companies and 
mercenaries under the UN Convention”). 
 89. See U.N. Mercenary Convention, supra note 88, arts. 2–4. 
 90. See Id. arts. 7, 9. 
 91. See generally Press Release, General Assembly, Mercenaries Often a Presence in 
Terrorist Attacks, Special Rapporteur Tells Third Comm. as it Begins Discussions on Self-
Determination, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3650 (Oct. 31, 2001). 
 92. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S 75. (listing parties and signatories to The Conven-
tion). See generally Salzman, supra note 1, at 878–79 (noting the lack of interest among 
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III. CRITICAL ELEMENTS TO ASSESS LEGALITY OF PMCS 
If one accentuates the core international law principles that sovereignty 
be respected, that the use of military force be justified, and that states as-
sume responsibility for the illicit use of force, all privatized military combat 
operations might be construed as morally askew or illegal,93 even if PMCs 
are not strictly defined as mercenaries under international law.94 It is not 
exacting to appraise the lawfulness of private combatants at the extremes—
private contractors engaging in armed combat operations without a connec-
tion to a government are likely illegal mercenaries, but private contractors 
employed to facilitate or sustain a non-combat mission for a state are likely 
engaging in legal operations within the parameters of existing international 
law. From the context of these extremes, it appears that proposed interna-
tional and domestic level regulatory frameworks should ponder three critical 
elements in terms of contemporary circumstances. 
The first element is whether the non-state actor is engaged in hostilities 
for financial gain that is substantially more than what a state would pay mili-
tary troops, but as will be emphasized in the next section, there might be a 
nominal distinction between mercenaries and PMCs in this regard. The sec-
ond element is the type of operation that the private contractor executes. The 
more that private military forces are engaged in offensive combat opera-
tions, defensive combat operations, and strategic activities that are typically 
the prerogative of a state’s military, the more those private contractor opera-
tions should be suspect of mercenarism,95 but these are precepts that should 
be formulated by the international community. 
 
developed states); Chesterman, supra note 53, at 40 (referring to the long period of garnering 
signatures and noting that there were only twenty-two signatories by 1999 who were willing 
to abolish the use of mercenary forces under the Convention). 
 93. See Frye, supra note 11, at 2653 (noting opinion of Human Rights Watch fellow 
Montgomery Sapone); SINGER, supra note 21, at 37 (profiteer soldiers began to be viewed as 
illegitimate in the nation-state system). 
 94. Scheimer, supra note 80, at 633 (“[I]t is misleading to claim PMCs are not ‘merce-
naries’ simply because they do not fall under Article 47 and U.N. Convention definitions.”); 
see Report on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding 
the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/15 (Dec. 24, 2003) (“one of the 
greatest problems in combating mercenary activities is an absence of a clear, unambiguous 
and comprehensive legal definition of a mercenary.”); Frye, supra note 11, at 2613, 2637–38, 
2656 (stating that the term “mercenary” has a controversial overtone and it is difficult to 
define); Newell & Sheehy, supra note 74, at 71, 93; Scoville, supra note 81, at 541–42. 
 95. Most commentators would likely agree that offensive operations should never be 
conducted by PMCs and there may be more division in opinion over the latter two categories. 
Alternatively, if PMCs are not armed and thereby cannot have a combat-related mission, the 
use of the military contractors should not raise the types of hazards that have historically been 
implicated by the use of mercenaries. 
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If the first two elements are met with an improper mission, an interna-
tional agreement might impose a rebuttable presumption that the contractor 
possesses the attributes of a mercenary. If the PMC has a permissible or 
suspect mission, the third element requires the state to sustain the burden of 
proving that it assumes accountability for the private contractor’s operations 
and imposes discipline in a manner sufficiently comparable to the responsi-
bility over and disciplinary structure imposed on the state’s official military 
forces, or the private contractors might be regarded as mercenaries.96 Section 
A discusses the financial gain element, section B addresses types of contrac-
tor activities, and section C considers the level of control. 
A. Financial Gain 
Protocol I defines mercenaries as soldiers “specifically recruited . . . in 
order to fight in an armed conflict. . .[and] motivated to take part in the hos-
tilities essentially by the desire for private gain.”97 The motivation underly-
ing participation is exemplified by the fact that compensation paid to merce-
naries is “substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party.”98 In the case 
of the Iraq War and occupation, contractors earned three to four times more 
than U.S. military troops.99  A PMC employee could earn approximately 
 
 96. See Scoville, supra note 81, at 564–65 (defining a mercenary by including those who 
aid and abet what are criminal acts under international law and those who are not legally 
accountable to its own government); Milliard, supra note 42, at 87–93 (contending an inter-
national agreement is necessary and that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
should administrate all transfers of private military forces). Some experts may find controver-
sial the possibility that contractors could be considered mercenaries when employed by a 
state. See CAMERON & CHETAIL, supra note 88, at 68 (citing a debate that states “An essential 
aspect of the definition of mercenaries when it comes to their ‘use’ or employment by states 
is that under any convention or by legal definition, a person is not a mercenary if he is incor-
porated into the state’s armed forces. . . This fact is almost always been treated as a ‘loop-
hole’ in the repression of mercenarism”). One can maintain that if a sufficient level of con-
trol, responsibility, and disciplinary structure does not exist, the private military forces are 
not incorporated into the armed forces. 
 97. Protocol Additional, supra note 10, art. 47(2)(a)–(c); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & 
LOUIS DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 393 (2005) 
(stating that many countries define mercenaries as hired combatants for private gain); JANICE 
E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 26 (1994) (“one who fights for an 
employer other than his home state and whose motivation is economic”). 
 98. Protocol Additional, supra note 10, art. 47(2)(c). 
 99. Finkelman, supra note 6, at 442–43; Congressional Budget Office, Contractor’s 
Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, at 14 (Aug. 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12-iraqcontractors.pdf (acknowledging numbers 
confirming that private contractors can make nearly ten times more than U.S. troops but then 
rationalizing that these numbers represent the PMC’s billing rate for each personnel, as op-
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$1,000 per day and enlisted U.S. troops earned between $1,193 and $5,054 
per month.100 
There can be a catalyst for fighting that at an extreme includes histori-
cal private commerce raiders who were only motivated by the prize money 
produced from robbery101 or the more contemporary example of contractors 
who are privately compensated combatants in armed conflict.102 Alternative-
ly, if a state hires contractors to participate in the state’s mission or the con-
tractors are authorized by the state, there is a potentially redeeming justifica-
tion. However, if a private contractor is paid “significantly in excess” of the 
compensation allocated to a state’s armed forces for similar functions and 
qualifications103 and contractors would not participate without that addition-
al compensation,104 it should probably not perfunctorily be presumed that 
patriotic intentions and dedication to the state’s mission are the foremost 
driving forces,105 particularly when a significant percentage of PMC person-
nel are nationals of foreign countries.106 
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War, 84 FOREIGN AFFS. 119, 129 (2005) (stating private contractors earn two to ten times 
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Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–136, sec. 601(b), 1009, 117 Stat. 1392, 1495–98 (2003) 
(providing standards military pay grades). 
 101. BENERSON LITTLE, PIRATE HUNTING: THE FIGHT AGAINST PIRATES, PRIVATEERS, AND 
SEA RAIDERS FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 9–10 (2010); HAROLD H. MARTIN & JOSEPH 
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473 (1918) (contending that privateering’s intention is “not fame or chivalric warfare, but 
plunder and profit.”); CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, SEA POWER IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE WAR OF 
1812 242 (1905). 
 102. Simon Chesterman, Lawyers, Guns, and Money: The Governance of Business Activi-
ties in Conflict Zones, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 330 (2011) (stating that PMCs such as Black-
water, Triple Canopy, and others in Iraq might be called mercenaries, but PMCs do not fight 
wars for a fee, such as the case of the now defunct EO and Sandline International in Sierra 
Leone, Angola, and Papua New Guinea in the 1990s). 
 103. Protocol Additional, supra note 10, art 47(2)(c). 
 104. Scoville, supra note 81, at 556–58 (opining that the necessity of the private gain 
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foremost objective, PMC employees might remain in the military and perform similar tasks 
for less compensation. 
 106. Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 993 (2005) (referenc-
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To further address the financial motive for PMC participation from a 
systemic perspective, consider the following: has global economic change 
intrinsically veiled the financial motivation element by imputing that the 
dominance of corporate and capitalist economic influences has exonerated 
PMC operations?107 As indicated in Part II, extra-state fighting forces exist-
ed for hundreds of years and fell into disuse with the rise of the sovereign 
system, but the au courant arrangement is corporatization of private military 
firms,108 which was a transition from the swelling military-industrial com-
plex during the Cold War.109 
After the Cold War, the number of state-employed military forces sub-
stantially decreased,110 weapons and private mercenary forces were available 
for hire, privatized military enterprises proliferated,111 and the private sector 
became substantially more enmeshed in military security services.112 Both 
Britain and the United States substantially reduced the size of their active 
militaries.113 The United States cut defense spending by 26% after the Soviet 
 
ing contracts with citizens of Bangladesh and the Philippines). Foreign recruitment not only 
obviates the prospect of possessing national loyalty for a foreign policy but may reduce PMC 
costs and increase profitability when personnel are recruited from developing countries with 
lower per capita incomes. As with mercenary firms, investors have a profit motive and PMC 
executives and personnel could be motivated by higher pay instead of patriotic allegiance to a 
mission. 
 107. Zarate, supra note 60, at 87 (“These independent mercenaries, hired outside the 
constraints of the twentieth century Nation-State system and seemingly motivated solely by 
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 108. SINGER, supra note 21, at 19–20, 45. 
 109. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. President, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961), avail-
able at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp; See also Christopher A. 
Preble, The Founders, Executive Power, and the Military Intervention, 30 PACE L. REV. 688, 
699 (2010). 
 110. Maogoto & Sheehy, supra note 65, at 105 (stating that three years after the end of 
the Cold War, military forces decreased to seven million and former soldiers were unem-
ployed and military arms, such as machine guns, grenades, and other heavy weapons were 
sold to the lowest bidder). 
 111. SINGER, supra note 21, at 44–50, 65–70; HERBERT M. HOWE, AMBIGUOUS ORDER: 
MILITARY FORCES IN AFRICAN STATES 79–85 (2001) (listing humanitarian disaster in many 
African countries as a result of the end of the Cold War and the easy access to weapons and 
private military forces for sale); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003) (speaking more generally about an American general trend, 
“[p]rivatization is now a national obsession.”). 
 112. John W. Straw, Foreword to PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR 
REGULATION 4–5 (2002). 
 113. CARLOS ORTIZ, PRIVATE ARMED FORCES AND GLOBAL SECURITY 52–54 (2010); 
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Forces, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1990, at A1; Patrick E. Tyler, Military Chiefs Detail Plans to 
Cut Troops, Weapons, WASH POST, May 12, 1990, at A1. 
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Union dismantled114 and favored outsourcing and privatization115 consistent 
with the general trend of downsizing government.116 The size of the active 
U.S. military dropped from 3 million 117  to 2,174,200 in 1989, and to 
1,385,700 in 1999.118 As a result of these trends, the U.S. government em-
ploys about one-third of all private contract personnel in the world119 and the 
United States and Britain together account for more than 70% of annual 
global spending on private military companies.120 From the mid-1990s until 
2002, the Pentagon consummated over three thousand contracts with private 
contractors totaling an estimated value of $300 billion.121 The shift from 
nearly complete reliance on state-employed military troops to a higher reli-
ance of PMCs is displayed in the evolution of U.S. wars. 
Private contractors comprised only 3% to 5% of U.S. personnel during 
World War II and the Korean War.122 PMCs comprised less than 1% during 
the Vietnam War123 and 2% during the 1991 Gulf War. The number rose to 
10% during the 1999 Kosovo conflict and the percentage has continued to 
escalate during later wars.124 The number of PMCs in Iraq grew125 to more 
 
 114. Preble, supra note 109, at 699. 
 115. Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 400 (2006); Minow, supra note 106, at 1001. 
 116. SINGER, supra note 21, at 1–17, 66–70. 
 117. Cooper, supra note 21, at 2197. 
 118. Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Ru-
bicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 111 (2001). 
 119. SINGER, supra note 21, at 69. 
 120. Jenny S. Lam, Comment, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2009). 
 121. SINGER, supra note 21, at 14; Frye, supra note 11, at 2619. 
 122. Scott Horton, Adjunct Professor of Law, Columbia Univ., Prepared Statement, War 
Profiteering and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 51–52 (2007). 
 123. MEREDITH H. LAIR, ARMED WITH ABUNDANCE: CONSUMERISM AND SOLDIERING IN 
THE VIETNAM WAR 25 (Univ. N.C. Press, 2011) (stating that approximately 2.5 million U.S. 
troops served in the Vietnam War); Peters, supra note 43, at 380 (estimating that 9,000 pri-
vate contractors were used in the Vietnam War). 
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PUBLICATIONS 13, 15 (2004) (increasing privatization of U.S. military); Chris Lombardi, Law 
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Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A1 (about 20,000 private contractors); Car-
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Contractors in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at D01; John M. Broder & James Risen, 
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than 180,000 civilians working under private contracts in 2007—130,000 of 
whom were stationed at U.S. and Iraqi military bases—compared to some 
160,000 U.S. troops.126 In 2009, there were an estimated 190,000 to 210,000 
PMC personnel from over 900 private firms in Iraq.127 The ratio of private 
contractors to uniformed soldiers jumped from approximately 1:100 during 
the Gulf War, to 1:10 at the beginning of the 2003 attack on Iraq,128 to over 
1:1 during the later years of the occupation.129 The Economist referred to 
this arrangement as “the first privatized war.”130 
Drawing a prediction, Senator Lindsey Graham called the use of mili-
tary contractors “the way we are going to war in the future.”131 It is abun-
dantly true that many governments have increased their reliance on PMCs to 
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tion), at 1, (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Work-
ing Paper No. 07–09, May 2007) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
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execute operations normally performed by the military.132 Although exoge-
nous influences in the form of market mechanisms have the capability of 
commoditizing military force,133 it does not follow that outsourcing choices 
should be regarded as legal. In fact, rather than inherently rationalizing how 
military contracting may be an example of how the law has not cogently 
adapted to practice, the privatization of military services can also serve as an 
example of how practice should not so readily transgress existing legal insti-
tutions, particularly when the origin of the shift demonstrates that the prima-
ry motivation of PMCs is pecuniary. 
The private security industry has been a rapidly growing economic sec-
tor in the United States134 and many PMCs are publicly traded companies 
with stock values that, during the 1990s, appreciated at double the growth 
rate of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.135 The total value of the PMC 
market increased from $33.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010136 and 
the two hundred leading multinational PMCs recently received approximate-
ly $100 billion in annual revenue.137 In capitalist economies, investors risk 
funds under the assumption that companies will continue to profit, but the 
risk and potential profitability are dependent on foreign policy. In a democ-
racy, foreign policy should derive from rational and volitional public will. 
To the extent that a government aims to impart an illusion of a lower num-
ber of troops in a wartime scenario,138 perhaps because the government can-
not persuade a commensurate number of nationals to enlist at the prevailing 
military wage structure, this may signal that something is drastically wrong 
with the mission.139 
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Perhaps there are also concerns with delegating responsibility for recruiting, instilling patriot-
ism, and failing to properly educate those who execute missions, which may unfortunately 
permit the military chain of command to later avoid responsibility. 
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B. TYPES OF PARTICIPATION 
For the second element, the type of military participation is critical to 
determining whether the actor is a contractor with a legitimate mission, a 
mercenary with an illegal mission,140 or a PMC with a mission straddling a 
zone of controversy. The more contractor operations are isolated from mili-
tary combat, the less likely that contractors are engaging in controversial 
operations, in which case there is no need to proceed to the third element of 
whether the state assumes effective control over the contractor. Consider the 
following depiction of six types of operations with a progressively increas-




The first level of involvement is goods procurement. Governments to-
day do not operate factories and will procure goods to attain the most effec-
tive and cost efficient product.141 Goods procurement does not raise con-
cerns over mercenarism, although there have been apprehensions over the 
extent that interaction among politicians, the private sector, and military 
bureaucrats beget an “Iron Triangle” synergy that inclines military spending 
or foreign policy142 as President Eisenhower warned.143 It is currently esti-
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 143. See Eisenhower, supra note 109 (expressing to beware of the “military industrial 
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mated that 57% of Pentagon procurement involves services, rather than 
goods,144 and that 30% of the military service is handled by contractors.145 
For the provision of services, private military companies are normally 
engaged in three types of activities for government or non-government enti-
ties—consulting, support, and security.146 In the case of government pro-
curement for services in the United States, one might deduce that dismay 
over mercenarism would be harnessed because Congress established a 
standard in 1998 that prohibited the government from hiring private contrac-
tors for an “inherently governmental function,” which is “a function that is 
so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by . . . 
[g]overnmental employees.”147 The Pentagon accepted the intrinsic govern-
ment function standard.148 While there may be some ambiguity and disa-
greement over the meaning of an “inherently governmental function,” 149 
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anything involving combat is a core military function150 and national securi-
ty is unquestionably an essential government function.151 Among the field of 
services, the second category does not raise concerns, whereas the third 
through sixth categories can progressively grate anxieties. 
The second operation in the typology is contracts to administer ac-
commodations, non-combat logistics support, and training. PMCs involved 
in training operations are not participating in actual combat, and a military 
assuredly has the prerogative to use private instructors.152 Other examples of 
privatized services that do not invoke concerns of mercenarism include 
firms that accompany the military into a foreign location and remain outside 
the zone of combat, such as firms that provide housing, accommodations, 
food, and medical services.153 Under international law, PMC employees may 
also travel with the military to a location where there could be hostilities, in 
which case they are afforded “quasi-combatant status” and will have POW 
treatment, but cannot directly participate in hostilities.154 Even if civilians do 
not participate in combat, it may still be prudent to require the state employ-
er to assert reasonable control over contractors because the behavior of 
PMCs can impact the performance of the military155 and reflect poorly on 
the hiring nation.156 
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Categories three through six present the most consternation because 
contract terms have a significant impact on potential adversaries and the 
environment of operation. The third category is PMC operations that exe-
cute non-military security details. Non-military government employers and 
non-government employers throughout the world hire PMCs to conduct 
non-violent policing operations for businesses, malls, and various public and 
private organizations, but uncertainties materialize when PMC personnel are 
given weapons and orders to use the weapons. The legality of wielding 
weapons normally depends on existing laws and government approval in the 
country of operation. However, gray areas festered in Iraq. 
While a crime committed in a foreign country would normally fall 
within the sovereign territorial jurisdiction of the location of the wrong, in 
the case of the occupation of Iraq, the U.S.-controlled Coalition Provisional 
Authority, immediately prior to its dissolution, issued Order 17 and be-
stowed civil and criminal immunity to PMCs.157 For example, when an ap-
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parently drunken Blackwater security employee158 shot and killed Iraqi Vice 
President Mahdi’s bodyguard in December 2006,159  Blackwater fired the 
individual within thirty-six hours, flew him out of Iraq, and paid the dece-
dent’s family $15,000.160 The FBI investigated in Baghdad and sought to 
interview witnesses, but federal prosecutors were unable to support a case 
against the suspect.161 The United States possessed the prerogative to prose-
cute, but the Bush Administration apparently disfavored holding U.S. citi-
zens responsible for crimes related to war.162 
On September 16, 2007, Blackwater security personnel, operating un-
der a “personal protective services” contract on behalf of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State,163 fired at vehicles in Nisour Square, Baghdad, killing seven-
teen Iraqis and injuring twenty-four.164 The Blackwater personnel were trav-
eling in four armored vehicles and were not injured.165 The security guards 
contended that they fired in self-defense, but an FBI investigation deter-
mined that the shootings were not provoked or justified166 and that the vic-
tims were civilians who did not pose a threat to the safety of the guards.167 
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 159. Memorandum from the Majority Staff to the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Re-
form, at 9 (Oct. 1, 2007) [hereinafter House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform], 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20071001121609.pdf; E.L. Gaston, 
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International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 230 (2008) (noting 
that DynCorp was fired from the private security detail of Afghan President Hamid Karzai 
because of ill treatment of Afghans). 
 160. Eric Schmitt, Report Details Shooting by Drunken Blackwater Worker, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 2007, at A10. 
 161. James Risen, Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2010, at A1 (noting that the State Department offered use immunity to PMC employees in 
both the Moonen case and the Nisour Square case, which then prohibited their statements 
from being used in a criminal case). 
 162. Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the 
Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 731 (2007). 
 163. Christopher D. Belen, Reining in Rambo: Prosecuting Crimes Committed by Ameri-
can Military Contractors in Iraq, 27 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 169, 173 (2008). 
 164. House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, supra note 159, at 6; Belen, supra 
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Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1. 
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N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at A12. 
 167. Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1449, 1450 (2009). 
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Americans and foreigners were outraged over the iniquity168 and the Iraqi 
government called for Blackwater to be removed from Iraq,169 but Blackwa-
ter returned to operations three days later.170 
The case illustrates some of the explicit and implicit concerns histori-
cally posed by mercenary forces, including sovereign territorial preroga-
tives, the lack of an adequate legal structure governing combatants, and the 
reasonableness of firepower of security personnel.171 The Blackwater guards 
in the Nisour Square massacre were not military contractors and were not 
subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice,172 but the contractors were 
so heavily armed that they fired machine guns and launched grenades at 
perceived security threat targets.173 Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior could have 
revoked a PMC’s license and the Iraqi government might have overturned 
CPA Order 17;174 however, the U.S. Department of State persuaded the Iraqi 
government not to expel Blackwater, which was an instance of pressure that 
may connote a lack of sovereign equality. The massacre led the U.S. State 
Department to consider the issue of private contractors,175 but inherent prob-
lems paralleled the lack of sovereign authority that was generally posed by 
mercenaries because the U.S. government struggled with the decision to 
bring charges even though at least 14 of the 17 killings were without 
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cause.176 Prosecutors did eventually indict five Blackwater guards on invol-
untary manslaughter charges in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia in January 2009.177 The court dismissed the case, but new 
charges were brought against the Blackwater personnel in October 2013 and 
four guards were convicted one year later.178 
With operations ending in Afghanistan and Iraq, PMC revenue sources 
would presumably be reduced, but some PMCs adapted and were broaden-
ing operations into maritime security, guarding businesses in Africa, and 
searching for operations in new markets.179 As PMC activities were being 
scaled back in Iraq, the U.S. Navy encouraged merchant fleets to consider 
hiring private contractors to secure waterways that might be at risk for pira-
cy.180 The law regarding such operations remains ambiguous because the 
flag state of the vessel generally holds jurisdiction over acts committed 
aboard vessels and the International Maritime Organization has historically 
disfavored the use of force as a response to piracy.181 In the search for new 
opportunities, the founder of Blackwater remarked that he believes the new 
hot spot for PMC operations will be Africa where he is investing in security 
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operations for energy companies.182 This sort of activity is not wholly incon-
sistent with the type of operations that led mercenaries to be banned in Afri-
ca over three decades ago, although the legality for security operations de-
pends on government assent in the state of operation. 
Another possibility that has been raised is whether an internationally 
sanctioned mission, such as a U.N. peacekeeping operation, might utilize 
PMCs.183 This prospect opens a potential danger that once mercenary-like 
forces are sanctioned for specific operations, they could be abused or over-
used.184 PMC operations have historically, and often controversially, been 
executed in locations across the world.185 If international authorities begin 
granting generous discretion for PMC operations to utilize lethal force for 
security operations, perhaps this will relay an erroneous message about the 
validity of similar private operations in other countries and regions. 
The fourth category consists of participating in strategic assistance for 
military operations without using weapons in combat. Being part of the lo-
gistics chain for combat has been interpreted broadly. For example, in Pub-
lic Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, the Israeli 
Supreme Court held that those who take a “direct part” in hostilities include 
personnel who gather intelligence, transport troops to and from hostilities, 
operate weapons, or provide services to those operating weapons.186 A Brit-
ish House of Commons report also construed the span of military combat 
operations comprehensively: “[t]he distinction between combat and non-
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combat operations is often artificial. The people who fly soldiers and 
equipment to the battlefield are as much a part of the military operations as 
those who do the shooting.”187 The U.S. military has encompassing defini-
tions of participating in hostilities, which include administering logistics 
support and intelligence operations and participating as guards and surveil-
lants.188 
PMCs in Iraq were conducting intelligence operations and interrogating 
detainees.189 Investigations revealed that private contractors committed ap-
proximately 16 of the 44 acts of interrogation abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.190 
CACI and Titan were implicated in injustices at Abu Ghraib, and Blackwa-
ter was awarded a contract to design assassinations of al-Qaeda leaders.191 
Not only are these activities that should not be contracted away, but assassi-
nations and abusive interrogations should not even be conducted by gov-
ernment agencies because they are illegal under international law.192 If inter-
national law forbids governments from perpetrating specified acts, but states 
instead obscure the official directives and the command chain leading to 
agent execution, this appears to provide a mode for government leaders to 
avoid responsibility193 or to engage in plausible deniability.194 
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The fifth and sixth areas of concern involve tasking PMCs with 
fighting, or otherwise procuring services that are more analogous to those 
performed by mercenaries.195 The fifth category encompasses defensive op-
erations and the sixth consists of offensive operations. These services are 
particularly muddled under U.S. practice because the most prominent exam-
ple of a function traditionally reserved for the military is “direct participa-
tion in hostilities,”196 but the Government Accountability Office called the 
Iraq War the first time that private contractors were being hired in almost 
direct replacement for military troops, including by engaging in combat.197 
Moreover, dissension festers over whether there should or can be a realistic 
distinction between engaging in offensive operations and being placed into a 
defensive security position in which combat is likely. 
Contractors in Iraq denied involvement in strategic military operations 
or offensive combat, but instead contended that they provided defensive 
services “concerned with the protection of people and premises.” 198  The 
Pentagon’s general order for contractors only permitted discharging weap-
ons in self-defense.199 A memo provided to the House Committee on Over-
sight and Government Reform indicated that over two and a half years in 
Iraq, Blackwater personnel were involved in 195 shooting incidents and 
investigations revealed that Blackwater personnel fired first in 84% of these 
events even though they were only allowed to fire in self-defense.
 200 
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In terms of laws of war, because combatants and civilians are the only 
clear labels in the law of armed combat, and because only members of the 
Armed Forces can decidedly be presumed to be legal combatants with a 
protected status,201 private security personnel engaging in operations with 
varying degrees of participation in hostilities introduce uncertainty under 
international law classifications.202 If PMCs do not meet the criteria to be 
considered legal combatants under international treaties,203 those involved in 
armed combat might be committing an illegal use of force and perpetrating 
crimes of aggression.204 Pursuant to international law, spies, mercenaries and 
other unlawful combatants all can be distinguished from the civilian catego-
ry.205 Consequently, whether PMC personnel are granted a protected status 
under the Geneva Conventions, based on contract activities, should be es-
sential to determining whether security personnel might embody the charac-
teristics of a mercenary due to the policy intentions undergirding restrictions 
on privatized use of force under international law. 
Apparent crimes were committed by security firms in other countries 
that should have imparted notice of the potential dangers of using private 
contractors in Iraq and of the need for adequate regulations.206 Whether the 
concerns are inflated relative to the depth of PMC participation,207 Iraqis did 
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portray anger over the impunity that Blackwater, Triple Canopy,208 Custer 
Battles209 and other PMCs were granted after killing and injuring Iraqis.210 
The Department of Defense recognized that private security firms were pro-
voking confrontation with locals, including by firing on civilians,211 while 
attempting to fulfill the terms of their contracts. 212  Arming and placing 
PMCs into positions where combat is likely to occur should call into ques-
tion the legitimacy of the fifth and sixth categories and breed dubiety over 
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whether these categories can be suitably differentiated. Perhaps the assump-
tion under both of these types of operations should be that contractors pos-
sess the characteristics of mercenaries if PMCs are not operating under and 
subject to authorized state authority and control. 
C. Effective Control 
1. Control to Assure Responsibility and Accountability 
If the first two elements are met, the third proposed element for distin-
guishing between a legal contractor and an illegal mercenary is whether a 
state embraces effective control over the subcontractor. 213  Any firm that 
employs organized lethal force without operating under the auspices of a 
government or in a manner that is consistent with the laws of the country of 
performance lacks legitimacy and might be deemed a mercenary, insurgent 
group, or even a terrorist force.214 If a state employs PMCs for an extraterri-
torial mission without a convincing legal structure to govern, control, and 
discipline the PMC, or if the state does not assume responsibility for the 
PMC operations, perhaps there is only a negligible distinction between the 
mission and mercenary activities.215 Finding otherwise could permit a state 
to outsource controversial or even illegal operations while avoiding respon-
sibility and liability. If the same tasks were executed by uniformed military 
troops, the operations would perfunctorily be ascribed to the state, but with-
 
 213. Corn, supra note 140, at 263 (opining that whether PMC functions should be con-
sidered legitimate should generally depend on the two key factors to indicate compliance 
with the law of armed conflict—whether there is command and discipline); Scoville, supra 
note 81, at 563–64 (maintaining that the key question of how non-state security forces should 
be treated should be whether they are accountable to a state). 
 214. Salzman, supra note 1, at 888–89 (recognizing the generalization is that mercenaries 
purportedly operate without a state’s consent, while private contractors are employed by a 
state). One might even view the legal status of terrorists today akin to that of privateers and 
pirates centuries ago. Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values: The Challenge at 
Home and Abroad, in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
143, 158 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2002) (“[P]irates, privateers and other early 
terrorists posed as great a threat to our nation as sovereign states bent on war.”). 
 215. Corn, supra note 140, at 258–60, 287 (explaining that a key question to determine 
the legitimacy of action under the international law of armed conflict is whether those “indi-
viduals who exercise discretion on the battlefield. . . are members of organized military units 
that operate within a military command, control, and disciplinary system” and further noting 
that “members of the armed forces are subject to responsible command, and they operate 
within a military hierarchy involving training, disciplines, and unitary loyalty. Therefore, 
they, and only they, should be permitted to perform tasks requiring the exercise of discretion 
that implicates the LOAC [Law of Armed Combat], because the discipline indelibly associat-
ed with the armed forces is expected to ensure compliance with this law.”). 
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out effective state control, a hired contractor could function like a mercenary 
without consequence.216 
In addressing a legal regime or implementation of standards for PMCs, 
if a government did not contract with a PMC, activities within the categories 
of non-military security services, strategic and logistics operations for com-
bat, defensive combat military contracts, or offensive combat military con-
tracts (categories three through six on the chart) might make the actor simi-
lar to a mercenary.217 If a government does hire a PMC, the question is 
whether the state assumes effective responsibility over the contractor’s par-
ticular activities. Rather than per se ascribing legality to the contractor’s acts 
when there is control, activities falling toward non-military security services 
may be more legitimate and those falling toward offensive combat military 
contracts would be most suspect, but states should form a consensus on the 
legality of specific activities. If states resolve that particular PMC undertak-
ings are sanctioned, it may also be sensible to mandate that the hiring state 
sustain the burden of proving that only endorsed activities are being con-
ducted and that an irremissible level of control and responsibility over the 
PMCs are held, with the appropriate control intensifying at higher level ac-
tivities to ensure consistency with the legitimate use of force under interna-
tional law and to respect the sovereignty of the state of operation. If domes-
tic law establishes parameters and enforcement mechanisms for rules to as-
sure proper responsibility of military service firms,218 there is a greater like-
 
 216. Maogoto & Sheehy, supra note 65, at 102 (expressing the danger of states not plac-
ing effective checks on what is required of nationals, companies incorporated under their 
laws, and the services for which they contract, and explaining that “the ambiguous legal 
status and amorphous character of PMCs under existing international law offers leeway for 
countries to not only bend but breach their international obligations, thus tearing at the fabric 
of the international legal order.”). 
 217. Even point 2 could be suspect because if combat training is being conducted without 
the intention of fulfilling a government-authorized or for the intention of undertaking a non-
legal mission, there is preparation for an act that may be illegal. At an extreme, one might 
point to the pre-9/11 al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The intent of the non-
government group was at issue. The U.S. government criminalized attendance of a terrorist 
training camp. See U.S. v. Hamid Hayat, 710 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2013), available at  
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/03/13/07-10457.pdf; Kirk Semple, Pa-
dilla Gets 17 Years in Conspiracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at A14 (Jose Padilla was 
arrested and called an “enemy combatant” and Attorney General John Ashcroft said Padilla 
was a link in an “unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States” with a radioactive bomb, 
but there was no evidence of this plot and he eventually was convicted in January 2008 and 
sentenced to 17 years in prison for attending an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan in 2000). 
 218. Zarate, supra note 60, at 119 (contending that “transparency and . . . accountability” 
should be critical factors in distinguishing whether private military service firms should be 
legal). 
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lihood that the contracting state and the PMC are not undermining laws of 
war.219 
If the PMC’s acts, pursuant to a government procurement contract, are 
illegal, the principle-agent relationship could ascribe war crimes responsibil-
ity on the contractor under international law, even when fulfilling a state’s 
military-ordered mission,220  and on the contracting state for involvement 
with the PMC.221 It is true that states are generally not responsible for ac-
tions of private organizations and citizens unless there is a basis to ascribe 
liability on the state,222 but command responsibility can extend to those in 
non-military positions223 and private individuals can be de facto state organs 
when acting in conjunction with state authorities.224 Moreover, on their own, 
common organizations, entities, and corporations, have not traditionally 
been viewed as subjects of international law, but non-state entities do have 
some obligations.225 Recently, the United Nations expressed much interest in 
ensuring that transnational organizations comply with acceptable corporate 
 
 219. See Protocol Additional, supra note 10, art 43 (requiring combatants to be “subject 
to an internal disciplinary system”). International law restrictions affirm that governments 
cannot delegate away responsibility under international law, but instead must be responsible 
for the actions of contractors. Dickinson, supra note 41, at 162–63; ELSEA & SERAFINO, supra 
note 126, at 26 (“A lack of strict accountability in case of an abuse by a contractor could . . . 
incur liability on the part of the United States for a breach of its international obligations.”). 
 220. See Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firms Under International Law, 9 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 213, 218 (2008) (stating that it is possible that contractors could be held responsible 
under the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I, and the Hague Conventions). 
 221. Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., April 23–June 6, July 2–Aug. 10, 2010, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 63; GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), available at 
www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf (“Every internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State.”). There can be state responsibility for 
“conduct consisting of an action or omission [that]: (a) is attributable to the State under inter-
national law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.” Id. at 
68. 
 222. See Maogoto & Sheehy, supra note 65, at 109–10. 
 223. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 363 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For 
the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 16, 1998), available at http://www.icty.org/case/mucic/4. 
 224. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (“[P]rivate individuals acting within framework of, or in 
connection with, armed forces, or in collusion with State authorities may be regarded as de 
facto State organs. In these cases it follows that the acts of such individuals are attributable to 
the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may also generate individual crimi-
nal responsibility.”). PMC activities can be credibly expressed as being equivalent to tradi-
tional state activities of coercive force due to the frequent nexus with the sovereign mission 
and paramount international restrictions on the use of force. 
 225. See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 820–21 (2007). 
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responsibility benchmarks, particularly when pursuits impact human 
rights.226 
Without consummating internationally agreed upon standards for the 
employment of PMCs and for the objective enforcement of those standards, 
a state could shirk responsibility over reasonable duties to control private 
actors. The quandary is that international law imputes liability when there is 
a meaningful association between the state and a private actor;227 on the oth-
er hand, if the PMC is to have more legitimacy (and not be under suspicion 
of being a mercenary force), the state should have a tight degree of control 
over the PMC.228 This was the problem with the Iraq War. The Pentagon 
continued to contract with PMCs to execute what were arguably inherent 
military functions and assumed that it had no duty to impose heightened 
scrutiny of PMC operations,229 as in the case of general independent contrac-
 
 226. See Subcomm. on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rights, Norms on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 55th Sess., Aug. 13, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, at 2 
(Aug. 26, 2003); David Weissbrodt, International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights 
Responsibilities of Businesses, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 373, 382 (2008). 
 227. The hesitancy of imputing liability on the state is exhibited in the ICTY case, which 
held that “the acts of a military or paramilitary group” can be attributed to the state when “the 
State wields overall control over the group” and its planning, and affirmed that the state can 
still be liable for the private group even if the state does not order “specific acts contrary to 
international law.” Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A at ¶¶ 131, 137 (“In order to attribute the acts 
of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that the State wields overall 
control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinat-
ing or helping in the general planning of its military activity. Only then can the State be held 
internationally accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary 
that, in addition, the State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, 
instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to international law.”). 
 228. This consternation of being perceived as a private insurgency force without legiti-
macy is demonstrated in the International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua v. U.S. case, which 
held that liability for violations of international law could be imposed on the state when it has 
“effective control” over the private actor. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64–65, ¶ 115 
(June 27, 1986). The Reagan administration funded, equipped, and trained the Contras, and 
arguments were made about acting in defense of contiguous states in opposing the Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua, but liability was not assessed on the United States “because it did not 
have effective control of [the Contra’s] paramilitary operations.” Id.; VINCENZO RUGGIERO, 
THE CRIMES OF THE ECONOMY: A CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 163 
(2013) (noting that private contractors trained the Contras in the Reagan Administration’s 
Iran-Contra scandal during the 1980s). What exists under general agency law, international 
law, morality, and logic, is that state liability should be assessed against the acts of private 
contractors, but there are frequent loopholes in domestic law that take away that responsibil-
ity. Mercenaries cannot carry out operations inside the United States. Why should it then be 
assumed that the Pentagon should be able to hire PMCs to carry out military operations in 
another country? 
 229. Bejesky, supra note 139, at 10–27. Events in Iraq led commentators to assert that the 
United States hired PMCs for mercenary activities and to elude responsibility. Traci Hukill, 
Should Peacekeepers Be Privatized?, 36 NAT’L J. 1526, 1527 (2004) (noting that David 
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tors (rather than employees), but the classification of task and interrelation 
with military planning and operations made the assumptions disconcerting. 
2. Proposals to Oversee Contractors 
Due to high profile PMC operations in Iraq, states and organizations in-
itiated inceptive steps to tighten the effective state control over PMCs, in-
cluding by adopting clearer and deeper domestic regulatory structures to 
facilitate more state control over contractors, by initiating state-led interna-
tional efforts to deter the incidence of mercenary-like wrongdoing, and by 
improving PMC performance with self-regulatory bodies. The first approach 
provides the most coercive mechanisms because of the heightened efficacy 
of domestic enforcement mechanisms. The second approach is most effec-
tive for achieving uniformity in licit PMC operations, but it lacks coercive 
authority. The third option of introducing industry regulatory bodies could 
have some impact on reducing mercenary-like wrongdoing, but this self-
interest approach does not directly address state obligations or implicate a 
broad-based international effort to determine which PMC activities might be 
more suspect. 
At the domestic level, some states have addressed the PMC problem, 
but rules exhibit stark contrast in ideology. Several countries have passed 
anti-mercenary laws 230  and adopted regulations and licensing systems to 
curtail restricted PMC activities and to amend the functioning and oversight 
of security contractors. 231  Other countries have ignored the existence of 
PMCs232 or have not effectively enforced rudimentary domestic laws.233 In 
the United States, after several years of hiring PMCs for expansive tasks 
while having ineffective legal restrictions, Congress adopted extensions 
under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 to apply the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice to PMC personnel “accompanying an armed force 
in the field” during a “time of declared war or in a contingency opera-
 
Wimhurst, spokesperson for the U.N. Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
discussed this concern about responsibility: “So you get a gang of mercenaries in there, basi-
cally. Who do they report to? Who controls them? It’s a nonstarter.”). 
 230. Frye, supra note 11, at 2636–37 (listing Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the 
Ukraine); Milliard, supra note 42, at 41 (noting that the Soviet Union remarked during the 
Working Group activities to prohibit mercenaries: “We hope that this article . . . will provide 
an incentive to Government to adopt domestic legislation prohibiting . . . the use of mercenar-
ies.”). 
 231. Chesterman & Lehnardt, supra note 131, at 5. 
 232. Singer, supra note 156, at 524, 535–37. 
 233. Id. at 547 (using the example of the United States). 
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tion.”234 Other states have stressed that privatization of military activities 
should be banned,235 imputing that attempts to regulate private contractors 
merely confers legitimacy when the system of security firm contracting 
should be abolished altogether.236 
Discordant positions at the domestic level are particularly precarious 
because multiple countries, legal systems, ideologies, and interests can be 
implicated when PMCs are hired. If there is a state contractor, the jurisdic-
tions include the military contractor’s home country, a PMC’s state of in-
corporation,237 and the country where the PMC operates, but there is also the 
indirect but inclusive international community interest that favors ensuring 
that situations of armed conflict are judiciously governed by the U.N. Char-
ter and the Geneva Conventions.238 Fostering consonance at the international 
level on PMC standards could reduce the uncertainty and ad hoc responses 
under domestic law,239 but industry regulatory bodies can be mutually rein-
forcing with international approaches. 
Industry associations have arisen in recent years and have offered 
standards that might be relevant to distinguishing between a mercenary and 
a legitimate security contractor, but it is uncertain whether private associa-
 
 234. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2007); See Bejesky, 
supra note 139, at 35–46 (describing the lack of governing restrictions for several years). 
 235. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1295, 1300 (2003). 
 236. Caroline Holmqvist, Private Security Companies: The Case for Regulation, 
STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST. POLICY PAPER NO. 9, at 42 (2005), available at 
http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP09.pdf (stating that many scholars advocate a total ban 
on private security firms because they are not legitimate actors, but further contending that a 
total ban is unrealistic). 
 237. Singer, supra note 156, at 535 (noting that if prosecution in the home country is the 
most viable alternative and if PMCs want to avoid prosecution in the parent country, they 
might just move their operations to another base of operation). 
 238. HANNAH TONKIN, STATE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
COMPANIES IN ARMED COMBAT 45 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (expressing that there can 
be “a deep-seated opposition within the international community to the direct involvement of 
foreign, private military actors in civil strife” and that “PMSCs are only too aware that their 
survival depends upon the positive perceptions of their home states and of the international 
community”); GERRY J. SIMPSON, LAW, WAR & CRIME: WAR CRIMES, TRIALS AND THE 
REINVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (2007) (noting that international lawyers made 
war and breaches in war illegal by the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Convention and Proto-
cols). For example, presentiment can fester when there is both a weak target state that lacks 
regulations banning unlawful PMC activities or is unwilling or unable to enforce existing 
proscriptions and a dominant hiring state that lacks regulations, permits layers of contracting 
and subcontracting to weaken state control and oversight, or exhibits reluctance to extend 
jurisdiction over PMC activities executed in the target state of operation. All peripheral states 
may have some degree of interest in ensuring that fundamental U.N. system principles of 
sovereign equality and mutual respect for sovereignty are upheld. 
 239. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibil-
ity, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 448 (2001). 
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tions can be effective as self-regulatory bodies,240 if they can assure adher-
ence to international law without state intervention in enforcement, or 
whether the community of states assents to the private standards. For exam-
ple, nearly fifty private security companies are members of the International 
Stability Operations Association (formerly the International Peace Opera-
tions Association), which requires members to abide by standards241 that 
include upholding human rights norms, respecting human dignity, working 
for recognized governments and lawful organizations, operating with trans-
parency, training employees on applicable law, ensuring that employees are 
of sound character, and accepting accountability for employee transgres-
sions.242 In addition to concerns raised over the organization lacking trans-
parency and not having systems to ensure objectivity,243 there are no sub-
stantial coercive mechanisms to effect compliance. The self-enforcement 
system operates by publicizing potential wrongdoing of member compa-
nies.244 
Two other industry associations include the Private Security Company 
Association of Iraq (PSCAI) and the British Association of Private Security 
Companies (BAPSC).245 Unfortunately, these agencies have potential trans-
parency deficits, a lack of independence, uncertain and ostensibly feeble 
enforcement mechanisms, and an absence of explicit standards.246 With re-
spect to the BAPSC and the fact that Britain is one of today’s leading PMC 
employers, England did have a long history of and experience with using 
mercenary forces to enforce colonialism;247 however, that exposure lacks 
contemporary pertinence and unilateral home state-led supervision may not 
inspire global confidence. Iraq’s ad hoc and circumstance-specific domestic 
level approach with the PSCAI may not be sufficiently reassuring from the 
perspective of an occupation that commentators contended was overrun by 
overpaid contractor firms fulfilling military-like operations248 and when Or-
 
 240. Ranganathan, supra note 176, at 375–76. 
 241. ISOA Code of Conduct, INT’L STABILITY OPERATIONS ASS’N, http://www.stability-
operations.org/?page=Code (last visited Mar. 9, 2014); Membership,  INT’L STABILITY 
OPERATIONS ASS’N, http://www.stability-operations.org/?page=Membership (last visited Mar. 
9, 2014). 
 242. Ranganathan, supra note 176, at 320–23. 
 243. James Cockayne & Emily Speers Mears, Private Military and Security Companies: 
A Framework for Regulation, INT’L PEACE INST., at 4 (2009), available at http://www.ipinst.
org/media/pdf/publications/pmsc_epub.pdf. 
 244. Id.; See e.g. Chesterman, supra note 102, at 335 (noting that after the Nisour Square 
massacre, the Association investigated the events, Blackwater withdrew its membership in 
the organization and announced that it would be establishing its own monitoring organiza-
tion, the Global Peace and Security Operations Institute). 
 245. Ranganathan, supra note 176, at 310. 
 246. Id. at 360–63. 
 247. Id. at 315–16. 
 248. See supra Part III.B. 
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der 17 usurped Iraq’s ability to regulate and effectively enforce laws for 
several years.249 
From the deficits in these self-regulatory associations, more permanent 
state-led approaches that embody a spectrum of interests would be favora-
ble. The urgency is heightened by the fact that contractors, target states, 
employer states, and the international community all have interests. Even 
though a downturn in the military services market currently exists, there are 
those who emphasize that PMCs are here to stay, are searching for new 
market opportunities, and are the way that states will go to war in the fu-
ture.250 This context makes being complacent and willing to assume that Iraq 
was an anomaly, unlikely to be repeated, perilous to the rule of law. 
One recent state-led approach is the Montreux Document on Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Con-
flict, which was sponsored by the International Red Cross and the govern-
ment of Switzerland.251 The Montreux Document was adopted in September 
2008 with seventeen participating founding states, many of whom are the 
major users of PMCs, and thirty-three additional states have since joined.252 
There are no new international legal obligations, but the agreement sets 
forth suggestions to states when they choose to use private contractors,253 
offers standards that impose obligations on military contractors to not en-
gage in war crimes and other serious offenses,254 and reaffirms obligations in 
a context that oblige signatory states to control PMCs, particularly because 
the Document only applies to states engaged in armed conflict.255 There is a 
 
 249. See CPA Order 17, supra note 157, § 4. 
 250. Govern & Bales, supra note 12, at 56; Beyond Blackwater, supra note 182. 
 251. Switzerland & Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, The Montreux Document: On Perti-
nent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of 
Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/63/467 (Sept. 
17, 2008) [hereinafter Montreux Document], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files
/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
 252. Participating States of the Montreux Document, SWITZ. FED. DEP’T FOREIGN AFFS., 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/pse/parsta.html (last updated 
Nov. 12, 2014). 
 253. James Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security In-
dustry, INT’L PEACE INST. (2009), http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/beyond_
market_forces_final.pdf. 
 254. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, GENEVA 
ACAD., at ¶ 22 (2013), available at http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/
briefing4_web_final.pdf (affirming that military contractors will not “participate in, encour-
age, or seek to benefit from any national or international crimes including but not limited to 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, forced disappearance, forced or com-
pulsory labor, hostage-taking, sexual or gender-based crime, human trafficking, the traffick-
ing of weapons or drugs, child labor or extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.”). 
 255. Montreux Document, supra note 251, at 3, 5. 
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lingering anxiety, however, that the original member states, including the 
United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq, exhibited the most significant interest 
in the agreement.256 Because this is a global issue, it might be favorable for 
other states to also voice how, whether, and to what extent they approve of 
PMC use, and to consider if more restrictions on operations are necessary. 
In general, the self-regulatory bodies and industry standards can be 
constructed to encourage superior performance of legally authorized activi-
ties, particularly if mechanisms are objectively enforced so that powerful 
contractors and states do not capture the oversight process. However, defin-
ing legal activities in conjunction with the laws relating to the use of force, 
Geneva Convention rules on lawful combatants, and other international law 
standards is fundamental because states must enforce infractions as an effec-
tive deterrent. Allowing mercenary-like forces to execute operations because 
of the experience in Iraq and merely setting standards that permit states to 
unilaterally affirm that international laws will not be transgressed is an in-
sufficient promise if states attempt to replace official state troops with con-
tractors for the same activities.257 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The potential illicit use of PMCs has conjured much dismay because of 
the history of mercenarism and because of the general obligations of states 
under laws of war. Fighting for money dates back thousands of years,258 but 
privateering became illegal with the emergence of the nation-state system 
and mercenarism was condemned as an affront to countries seeking sover-
eign rights and independence during decolonization. Privatization of mili-
tary and security services has recently flourished, but not because there was 
a newfound respect for mercenarism, a broad-based authorization of PMCs 
as legitimate actors under use of force rules, or a domestic populace sanction 
of the privatization of foreign policy, but because of the assumed benignity 
and effectiveness of market mechanisms. The United Nations’ recent inter-
est in addressing this issue is certainly warranted because outsourcing of 
military conflict can be viewed as a noxious aspect of globalization, “an 
affront to sovereign power,”259 and perhaps a defiance of the states’ monop-
oly over the use of force.260 
 
 256. Participating States of the Montreux Document, supra note 252. 
 257. Also, tolerating when wealthy states hire security personnel from other countries, 
including developing countries with low per capita incomes, to execute a state’s foreign 
policy and bypassing the fundamental concept of a public authorization in the employer state 
is another festering issue. 
 258. LANNING, supra note 24, at 1. 
 259. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern Warfare: 
Sovereign Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. REV. 429, 
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This article discussed three contextually-derived inquiries as probative 
concerns for distinguishing between mercenaries and PMCs. First is the 
extent to which the contractor is motivated by pecuniary gain—profit drives 
the PMC industry. PMCs are business entities seeking profit (and sometimes 
maximization of stock value) and PMC personnel may forgo or exit military 
service to acquire substantially more compensation for similar obligations. 
The entity’s quest for profit and the employee’s desire for lucrative salaries 
may lead foreigners from countries with lower per capita incomes (and 
without national allegiance to a state that hires PMCs) to become part of a 
market for war. PMCs may increase profitability and taxpayers may be 
compelled to fund inefficient and costly PMC operations without adequate 
assent even if foreign policy questions are at stake and armed combat oc-
curs.261 
Second, a typology of PMC operations was presented and it was sug-
gested that states should negotiate and form a consensus over permissible 
PMC operations. Several categories of contracts do not raise concerns. For 
example, goods procurement is necessary because militaries do not operate 
factories; procurement that provides accommodations, training, and other 
civilian services does not result in combat; and non-military security details, 
which may include personnel who wield weapons, depend on the laws in the 
country of operation. PMC personnel who do not directly engage in combat, 
but undertake contractual obligations related to armed force in the field, 
such as services providing covert, logistic, or intelligence support to military 
troops can also be controversial functions because the Geneva Conventions 
protect non-combatant civilians, but services annexed to combat might be 
classified as engaging in combat.262 Defensive combat operations and offen-
 
450 (2008); Salzman, supra note 1, at 860 (“The pervasive use of private military force 
threatens the democratic nation-state because it (1) undermines the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force; (2) increases the executive’s power to wage war without democratic accounta-
bility; and (3) prioritizes the private good over the public good.”) 
 260. See generally Leander, supra note 124. 
 261. If the state wants to employ PMCs for operations that are similar to military troops 
and award excess compensation, then another option to ensure transparent public will is to 
consider modifying wage structures and compensation of military service members and avoid 
the ambiguities that are generated with the use of PMCs. 
 262. Some of these activities are generally specified in the Geneva Conventions. Geneva 
POW, supra note 76, art. 4. Some authorities have considered PMC operations that are relat-
ed to fighting to be involvement in armed combat. Schmitt, supra note 153, at 708–09; Mi-
now, supra note 106, at 1015–16. This possibility suggests that states might assess more 
detail about the status of this breed of PMC operations. Moreover, if military technology 
becomes more mechanized and less likely to place troops in combat (e.g. Predator drones 
strikes), the classification of the combatant can be further obscured. Dion Nissenbaum, 
Blackwater’s Founder Blames U.S. for Its Troubles, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304439804579203883470837874 
(reporting that Blackwater “secretly armed and maintained drones in Pakistan”). 
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sive combat operations might, for all practical purposes, be indistinguishable 
and tantamount to mercenarism, depending on expectations for the zone of 
operation and whether there is adequate state control or responsibility as-
sumed. 
Depending on how the international community views itemized PMC 
operations, the third proposal is that the hiring state should be obliged to 
prove that control and responsibility are assumed over the PMC for suspect 
operations.263 There was much debate during recent conflicts about combat-
ants hiding among civilians as a form of “cheating” on rules of warfare, but 
there may be parallels with states that hire PMCs and shirk responsibility264 
because warfare invokes sovereign prerogative and obligations. The world 
should agree on whether enumerated military and security operations can 
legally be relegated and how states can ensure an adequate level of control 
and responsibility over operations. In this context, states should also address 
the legality of non-state entities hiring itemized private security operations 
as the basis for domestic guidelines to thwart dangers of mercenarism and to 
protect against dominant states coercing weaker states. 
 
 263. Whether that proof should be offered prior to contracting or upon a dispute, and to 
whom the evidence should be presented, such as to a U.N. agency, are questions that should 
be addressed. 
 264. Recent problems are that functions that have traditionally been performed by state 
actors have been transferred to private actors without expressing clear rights and responsibili-
ties. Laura A. Dickinson, Accountability of State and Non-State Actors for Human Rights 
Abuses in the “War on Terror,” 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 53, 56 (2004). Private contrac-
tors have effectively permitted governments to avoid responsibility by hiding behind corpora-
tions. James R. Coleman, Constraining Modern Mercenarism, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1493 
(2004). PMCs have not been adequately regulated by the hiring state. Failing to recognize 
that the nation-state system prohibits the use of force by third-party non-sovereign interests 
and contending that there should be a loophole that permits private actors to execute missions 
typically carried out by the military, while also allowing states to avoid responsibility, is 
patently asinine. Just because a state hires the PMC should not in itself be exonerating if 
PMC operations involve fighting a war or carrying out sub-obligations of combat during 
occupation. 
